Table 3 Summary of the how wellbeing- and suffering-based conceptions of health and disease support an (a)symmetry view of moral obligation
From: Does disease incite a stronger moral appeal than health?
Theory, position, perspective | Relevant for or applied on health and disease |
|---|---|
Classical utilitarianism | We have an equally strong moral obligation to promote other persons’ health as we have to reduce (avoid or diminish) their disease |
Negative utilitarianism | There is a direct moral appeal from disease that is not matched by a moral appeal from health |
Ontology: - Substantial differences, different kinds, - Eliminativism | Disease has morally relevant elements or features (such as suffering) that health does not have One of the concepts cannot be defined or operationalized. For example, the enigma of health (Gadamer) |
Value theory, axiology: there are relative differences, different strengths | Disease has more moral weight than health |
Rule-based ethics/meta-ethics: morals have an asymmetrical purpose | Disease plays a more important moral role than health |
Virtue ethics: the moral asymmetry of virtues | Disease evokes virtues, health does not (or less so) |
Philosophy of language: logical and conceptual differences | Disease provides a higher moral pressure and has more moral weight than disease as do other pairs of value-laden concepts |